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Abstract—Information-Centric Networking (ICN) is a recent
paradigm that claims to mitigate some limitations of the current
IP-based Internet architecture. The centerpiece of ICN is named
and addressable content, rather than hosts or interfaces. Content-
Centric Networking (CCN) is a prominent ICN instance that
shares the fundamental architectural design with its equally
popular academic sibling Named-Data Networking (NDN). CCN
eschews source addresses and creates one-time virtual circuits
for every content request (called an interest). As an interest is
forwarded it creates state in intervening routers and the requested
content back is delivered over the reverse path using that state.
Although a stateful forwarding plane might be beneficial in
terms of efficiency, and resilience to certain types of attacks,
this has not been decisively proven via realistic experiments.
Since keeping per-interest state complicates router operations and
makes the infrastructure susceptible to router state exhaustion
attacks (e.g., there is currently no effective defense against interest
flooding attacks), the value of the stateful forwarding plane in
CCN should be re-examined.
In this paper, we explore supposed benefits and various
problems of the stateful forwarding plane. We then argue that its
benefits are uncertain at best and it should not be a mandatory
CCN feature. To this end, we propose a new stateless architecture
for CCN that provides nearly all functionality of the stateful de-
sign without its headaches. We analyze performance and resource
requirements of the proposed architecture, via experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) [1] is a networking
model that emerged as an alternative to the host-based commu-
nication approach of the current IP-based Internet architecture.
Content-Centric Networking (CCN) [2], [3] is one industry-
driven instance of this model. (It is closely related to Named-
Data Networking (NDN), which can be viewed as CCN’s
academic dual.) While IP traffic consists of packets sent be-
tween communicating end-points, CCN traffic is comprised of
explicit requests for, and responses to, named content objects.
These requests, called interest messages, refer to the desired
content by name. An interest is forwarded by routers (using
the name) towards a content producer until satisfied by the
latter or by a cached copy in some router. The corresponding
response, called content, is forwarded along the reverse path.
To reduce end-to-end latency and congestion, CCN routers
may opportunistically cache content to satisfy future interests.
In CCN, neither interest nor content messages carry source
addresses. In order to correctly deliver content to consumers,
routers maintain per-interest state as an entry in a so-called
Pending Interest Table (PIT). This state information maps
interest names to interfaces on which they arrived. This enables
a router which receives a content easily identify the forwarding
interface(s) using the corresponding PIT entry. Once a content
is forwarded downstream, the corresponding PIT entry is
flushed.
Another purpose of the PIT is to support interest col-
lapsing – a feature useful for handling multitudes of nearly
simultaneous interests for the same content. Whenever a router
receives an interest for which it has a matching PIT entry, the
arrival interface of the new interest is added to the existing
entry and the interest is not forwarded further. This prevents
duplicate interests from being sent upstream, thus lowering
overall congestion. However, as we show later in the paper,
interest collapsing rarely occurs in practice.
Furthermore, stateful forwarding enabled by PITs is sup-
posed to provide flow balance via path symmetry between
interest and content messages. Consequently, information from
the PIT (e.g., interest to content Round-Trip Time (RTT)) can
be used to develop better congestion control and traffic shaping
mechanisms; see [4]–[7]. However, using a PIT for flow
balance and in-network congestion control is quite problematic
in practice. In fact, flow balance is a false claim in the
current CCN design due to the (potentially huge) disparity
in sizes between interest and content messages. Likewise,
there is ample evidence that congestion control and transport
protocols are best deployed at the receiver [8]–[10], due to
flow imbalance and dynamic routing in CCN. Another claimed
advantage of stateful forwarding is that it can aid routers
when responding to network problems since they can make
autonomous and intelligent forwarding decisions for interests.
In practice, however, individual routers rarely have sufficient
autonomy to make such decisions.
From the perspective of infrastructure security, the PIT
effectively prevents reflection attacks since content is always
forwarded according to PIT entries [11]. However, such attacks
can be mitigated by mechanisms that do not require any for-
warding state. Moreover, this state is costly to maintain. Vari-
ous attempts to improve the efficiency of PIT-based forwarding
have been studied in the context of CCN and NDN [12]–[14].
However, they do not address the fundamental design issue that
the PIT size grows linearly with the number of distinct interests
received by a router. This means that a PIT is a resource that
can be easily abused. In fact, malicious exhaustion of PIT space
in the form of Interest Flooding (IF) attacks [11] remains an
important open problem. In such attacks, adversaries can flood
routers with nonsensical (i.e., unsatisfiable) or slow-to-satisfy
(i.e., requiring dynamic content generation) interests in order
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to maximize the occupied PIT space. Once a router reaches
its maximum PIT capacity it either: (1) drops new incoming
interests, or (2) removes existing entries to free resources
for new incoming interests. Unfortunately, these two options
result in effective DoS for legitimate future or current interests,
respectively.
Given that many of the claimed benefits are dubious and
considering associated the infrastructure security problems, it
becoms hard to justify the need for PITs in CCN. Therefore,
in this paper, we comprehensively assess (in Section II) the
stateful forwarding plane of CCN with respect to each claimed
benefit. We show that such benefits are: (1) either unrealistic
or infeasible in practice, (2) can be achieved by means other
than stateful forwarding, or (3) so marginal that their worth
simply does not justify the overhead. We then present, in
Sections III and IV, a new stateless architecture for CCN
based on Routable Backward Names (RBNs). This new design
can co-exist with the current CCN architecture (with PITs) or
replace it entirely. Experimental results in Section V indicate
that the new design still retains the essence and performance
characteristics of CCN while successfully avoiding pitfalls of
stateful forwarding. We conclude with a discussion of related
work and a summary in Sections VI and VII, respectively.
II. ASSESSING THE PIT
The PIT is a fundamental and mandatory feature of the
CCN forwarding plane. It is a tabular data structure that maps
interest names and other metadata to a set of information,
such as arrival interfaces and lifetime values. Arrival interfaces
are used to identify downstream interfaces on which content
responses should be forwarded. The shape and size of this
table is directly dependent on the traffic that is processed by
a forwarder. [15] studied dynamics of the PIT and showed
that the number of entries can range from less than 100 for
edge routers with a small number of per-namespace flows to
over 106 in the core. [14] designed a PIT implementation that
requires only 37MiB to 245MiB to forward traffic at 100Gbps,
which can scale to fit the needs of realistic traffic, according
to [15].
However, in this paper, we do not question the implemen-
taton of the PIT. Instead, we question its entire existence.
Below, we argue that aside from being unecessary to support
CCN-like communication, the PIT’s presence raises more
(serious) problems than it solves. We support our argument by
systematically analyzing the following alleged PIT benefits:
1) Content object forwarding
2) Interest collapsing
3) Flow and congestion control
4) Infrastructure security
We then show that all these benefits are either false, unneces-
sary, or very meager at best.
A. Content Object Forwarding
A key tenet of CCN is that content is never sent to a
consumer who did not previously issue an interest for the
(name of that) content. Since interests contain no source
addresses, PITs are needed “[t]o forward Content Objects from
producers to consumers along the interest reverse path by
leaving per-hop state in each router...” [2].
We disagree with this statement for two reasons. First,
network path symmetry is not guaranteed and should not
be assumed. Wolfgang et al. [16] demonstrated that route
symmetry between the same flow on the Internet is lower in the
core than at the edges. Several tier-1 and tier-2 networks were
studied and it was shown that, due to “hot-potato-routing,”
flow asymmetry exceeds 90% in the core. Thus, symmetric
path routing in the core appears to direct contradict today’s
practices that promote path asymmetry. Attempting to enforce
symmetric data traversal appears to be a challenge from an
economic perspective.
Second, pull-based communication with symmetric paths
is not well-suited for all applications. While appropriate for
scalable content distribution applications1, it is substantially
different from modern TCP/IP applications and protocols
which rely on point-to-point bi-directional streams between
endpoints. For instance, the WebSocket [17] protocol uses
full-duplex TCP streams for clients and servers that engage
in real-time, bidirectional communication. It is used by many
popular interactive applications, such as multimedia chat and
multiplayer video games. Two-way communication is not
limited to Web protocols. Voice applications such as Skype
[18] and peer-to-peer systems such as BitTorrent [19] rely on
two endpoints which both produce and consume data, as part
of the application.
Given the relative infancy of CCN and abundance of real-
world applications that currently do not fit CCN’s mold, it is
difficult to argue that the pull communication model can satisfy
all applications’ needs. For example, even some existing CCN
applications exploit interest messages to carry information
from consumers to producers [20]. Other applications rely on
consumers and producers to send interests to each other. NDN-
RTC, a recently developed NDN video teleconference applica-
tion, is one specific example that supports such bidirectional
communication between peers [21]. (We use NDN and CCN
interchangeably here since both are equivalent in this context.)
Another emerging application design pattern is data transport
via set synchronization, notably, the NDN ChronoSync proto-
col [22]. It enables data synchronization among a set of users.
Each ChronoSync user acts as both a producer and consumer.
Consumers (members) issue long-standing interests to a group
(common namespace) about specific data to be synchronized,
that are routed to all members. When target data is changed
by someone, this member satisfies previous interest(s) with a
fingerprint of the data in a content object. Each member is then
responsible for requesting updated content to synchronize with
the others.
Based on the trends of current TCP/IP applications and
proposed design strategies for CCN-based protocols and ap-
plications, it seems clear that bidirectional communication is
here to stay. For it to work, router FIBs need to contain
prefixes for all end-points – not just producers. Therefore, all
communicating parties need to obtain and use a routable prefix,
which effectively serves as an address. As a consequence,
forwarding information stored in a PIT becomes redundant
and unnecessary.
1Which some believe to be already well-served by today’s CDNs.
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B. Uitility of Interest Collapsing
Recall that collapsing applies only to interests arriving
at routers during a very small time-window ∆: between the
time of arrival of the original interest (referring to the same
name) that triggered creation of a new PIT entry, and the
time of arrival of the corresponding content. Due to increasing
network data rates and lower end-to-end delays facilitated
by in-network caching, the value of ∆ is expected to be
miniscule, e.g., on order of tens of milliseconds. Therefore,
we believe that the effect of interest collapsing would not play
any significant role in the real life performance of CCN.
To support this claim, we model the probability of interest
collapsing occurring in the first-hop router R. The reason for
choosing the first router is that the benefits of interest collaps-
ing are felt the most closest to the consumer(s). This is because
collapsing two similar interests at the consumer-facing router
reduces bandwidth usage more than when the same occurs
closer to the producer. We assume that content popularity
follows a Zipf distribution with classes k = 1, . . . ,K and
average number of segments σk.2 Let each class arrival rate
λk at R be modeled as a Poisson process. The event of interest
collapsing at R for content class k is denoted as CollRint(k).
The probability of this event is [23]:
Pr
[
CollRint(k)
]
=
1− e−∆λk
1− (1− 1/σk)e−∆λk (1)
Theorem 1: Assuming in-network routing is only enabled
at edge routers [24], the interest collapsing probability at
consumer-facing router R is:
Pr
[
CollRint(k)
]
=
(
1− pRk
)1−( L∏
i=1
e
− liαi
) 2λk
c
 (2)
for L links between R and producer P , c = 3× 108m/s the
speed of light, li the length of link i, constant αi that depends
on the characteristics of the link’s physical material, and pRk
the cache hit probability of a class k content at R.
Proof: We focus on modeling interest collapsing for
individual content objects. Thus, we set content size σk = 1
segment. Therefore, Equation 1 can be re-written as follows.
Pr
[
CollRint(k)
]
= 1− e−∆λk
However, taking into consideration content caching at R, the
previous equation can be further re-written as:
Pr
[
CollRint(k)
]
=
(
1− pRk
) (
1− e−∆λk) (3)
where
(
1− pRk
)
is the cache miss probability. In other words, if
requested content is cached, R satisfies corresponding interests
without creating PIT entries and interest collapsing does not
occur.
We now redefine ∆ as a function of propagation delays on
each link on the path: R ↔ P ↔ R. δi is the propagation
delay of the link between ri−1 and ri, where r0 = R and rL =
P . Moreover, pik represents cache hit probability at ri and, if
2Large content is typically split into smaller segments.
an interests generates a cache hit at ri, it is not propagated
further.
∆ = 2 ·
i∗∑
i=1
(
δi
(
1− pik
))
= 2 ·
i∗∑
i=1
(
li
αic
(
1− pik
))
where αic represents the propagation speed of link i, and 1 <
i∗ < L is the index of router ri∗ where a cache hit first occurs.
However, assuming that in-network caching only happens
at the edges and that δL is negligible relative to δ1 + δ2 +
· · · + δL−1 (we ignore the effect of caching at rL−1), cache
hit probability in all routers between R and P (not including
R) is zero, and:
∆ = 2 ·
L∑
i=1
li
αic
Therefore,
Pr
[
CollRint(k)
]
=
(
1− pRk
)(
1− e−
(
2·∑Li=1 liαic)·λk)
=
(
1− pRk
)(
1−
(
e
−∑Li=1 liαi ) 2λkc )
=
(
1− pRk
)1−( L∏
i=1
e
− liαi
) 2λk
c

This concludes the proof.
We analyze Theorem 1 in the following setup. For sim-
plicity’s sake, we use Equation 3 for content arrival rates and
propagation delays between R and P . Since content popularity
follows a Zipf distribution, arrival rate for class k + 1 is
half of that for class k, i.e., λk+1 = λk/2. To illustrate the
highest possible interest collapsing probability, we assume that
requested content (even if popular) is not cached at R. Figure
1(a) shows the collapsing probability of four content classes
k = [1, 4]. The graph only considers propagation delay up
to 4 milliseconds because, as shown in [23], the virtual RTT
(VRTT)3 for content class k = 4 is around 4 milliseconds.
We note that Pr
[
CollRint(k)
]
≤ 0.15 for the most popular
content (k = 1). However, in a more realistic setup where R’s
cache is taken into consideration, the highest interest collapsing
probability is < 0.05 for content class k = 2; see Figure 1(b).
Based on such low probabilities, we conclude that interest
collapsing is not crucial for a content distribution network such
as CCN.
C. Flow and Congestion Control
Yi et al. [25] presented the first thorough argument in
support of a stateful forwarding plane in the context of
NDN. Due to their near-identical features, the same applies
to CCN. The PIT can be used to record RTTs for interest
and content exchanges, which, in turn, is useful for making
dynamic forwarding decisions. For instance, if the RTT for a
3RTT taking into consideration existence of caches.
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Fig. 1. Interest collapsing probability at R
given namespace on a particular link becomes too high, that
link might be congested and alternatives should be explored.
This type of in-network congestion and flow control has been
studied further in [4], [10], [26]. For example, [27] propose a
joint hop-by-hop (i.e., in-network) and receiver-based control
protocol that relies on PIT-based RTT measurements for flows.
However, according to [7], flow differentiation is a difficult
challenge. Thus, one approach to “interest shaping” is by
controlling the flow of data on upstream and downstream links
independently of flows. This does not require any information
from the PIT. Instead, it relies on knowledge of average interest
and content size, link bandwidths, and interest arrival rates
(or demand). Similar to [10], it also relies on receiver-driven
flow control via an Additive-Increase-Multiplicative-Decrease
window. [28] is another example of a receiver-driven flow
control protocol for CCN. Given these results, current trends
in the ICN research community favor pushing stateful control
protocols to receivers, rather than to network nodes.
D. Infrastructure Security
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are a major threat to any
network infrastructure. DoS attacks in today’s Internet include:
bandwidth depletion, DNS cache poisoning, black-holing and
prefix hijacking, as well as reflection attacks. Gasti et al.
[11] show how CCN (in the context of NDN) prevents these
types of attacks. Out of all attack types considered, the PIT is
needed only to prevent reflection attacks [29]. Since content
is forwarded based on PIT entries such attacks are impossible
in CCN. However, forwarding content via the PIT is not the
only way to prevent reflection attacks. If packets have a source
address, the ingress filtering technique in [30] – whereby ISPs
filter packets based on source addresses – would work equally
well.
Despite its resilience to reflection attacks, CCN is suscep-
tible to another major attack type known as Interest Flooding
(IF) [11]. In one IF attack flavor, a malicious consumer (or
a distributed botnet) issues nonsensical interests4 so as to
overwhelm targeted routers and saturate their PITs. According
to [15], the PIT size can exceed 106 as upstream paths become
congested. The problem worsens if a malicious consumer and
producer cooperate to target a specific router. Although several
attempts to detect, mitigate, and prevent them have been made
[31]–[37]5 each of them is effective against only a very naı¨ve
or weak attacker. Thus, IF attacks remain a big open problem
with no comprehensive solution in sight.
III. STATELESS CCN USING BACKWARDS ROUTABLE
NAMES
Based on our earlier discussion, the price of a PIT comes
at the price of serious infrastructure security problems that
have not been addressed. To this end, we introduce a modified
stateless CCN architecture, called stateless CCN.
The main idea behind our stateless CCN design is simple:
an interest now includes a new field called Backwards Routable
Name (BRN), a routable prefix, similar to an IP source address.
A BRN indicates where the corresponding content should be
delivered, akin to an IP destination address. The corresponding
content carries the BRN as its routable name towards the
consumer. Thus, with properly configured FIB entries, con-
tent is correctly delivered to the requesting consumer.6 This
modification to the CCN architecture is clearly inspired by
IP – all packets (interest and content) are forwarded based on
addresses they carry and not on network state. However, as we
show below, this does not violate CCN’s core value of named
data being moved through, and stored in, the network.
To illustrate BRN-based forwarding, consider a scenario
where a consumer Cr with name lci:/edu/uci/ics/
bob (NCr) requests content from a producer P with the name
4For example, an interest with a name reflecting a valid producer’s prefix,
with a random number as its last component.
5For details, see Section VI below.
6This requires consumers to publicly advertise their BRN prefixes and
participate in routing.
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Message := MessageType PacketName [Payload] [Validation]
MessageType := Interest | ContentObject
PacketName := Name SupportingName
Name := CCNx Name
SupportingName := CCNx Name
Payload := OCTET+
Validation := ValidationAlg ValidationPayload
Fig. 2. Stateless Packet Format in ABNF; ValidationAlg and
ValidationPayload elements are defined in [39].
lci:/bbc/news/today (Nbbc).7 Let Int[N,SN ] be an
interest with the Routable Name N = Nbbc and Supporting
Name SN = NCr. Also, let C[N,SN ] be the corresponding
content object that matches Int[N,SN ] where C.N = Int.N ,
and C.SN = Int.SN . In this example, assume that C[N,SN ]
is not cached anywhere.
1) Cr advertises its name NCr and the routing protocol
propagates this information accordingly.
2) Cr issues Int[Nbbc, NCr].
3) The network forwards Int[Nbbc, NCr] to P according to
router FIB entries.
4) Once P receives Int[Nbbc, NCr] it replies with
C[Nbbc, NCr].
5) Similarly to Step 3, the network forwards C[Nbbc, NCr]
back to Cr using the same interest forwarding strategy.
Several modifications need to be made to the existing CCN
architecture and protocol to enable this communication. At a
minimum, interest and content object messages should carry
two names: one of the requested content and the other of the
requesting consumer. These two names corresponds to source
and destination IP addresses in today’s Internet.
We suggest modifying both interest and content headers
to include a new field called SupportingName (SN). This
field contains the BRN of the interest-issuing consumer. In the
above example, interest header would contain lci:/cnn/
news/today and lci:/edu/uci/ics/bob as N and
SN , respectively. The replied content header would contain the
same N and SN values. Note that content object signatures
can be generated in advance by omitting the content’s SN
field since this is only used for routing purposes. The resulting
packet formats are shown in Figure 2 in ABNF form.
Currently, interest and content messages are very similar in
CCN. Both contain a Name, Payload, and optional Validation
fields [39]; they only differ in the top-level type. Our stateless
variant still requires this distinction since interests and content
objects are processed differently. For example, a router first
attempts to satisfy an interest from its cache, while content is
(optionally) cached prior forwarding.
We stress that a content might not follow the reverse path
of the proceeding interest due to routing table configurations.
In fact, we anticipate that consumers might structure BRNs
to control the degree of path asymmetry between interest and
content messages.
Modified interst and content formats coupled with PIT
removal simplify router’s fast-path processing. Algorithms 1
7Names are encoded using the Labeled Content Identifier (LCI) schema
[38]. LCI names are the concatenation of individual name components,
separated by the ‘/’ character, in a typical URI-like format.
and 2 show how a router would process interest and content
messages. CS-Lookup represents a CS lookup operation based
on N (content name). For clarity’s sake, we omit content
verification details in all algorithms.
Algorithm 1 Process-Interest
1: Input: Interest Int[N,SN ], arrival interface Fi, CS, FIB
2: C = CS-Lookup(CS, N)
3: if C 6= nil then
4: Forward C to Fi
5: else
6: Fo = FIB.Lookup(N)
7: Forward Int[N,SN ] to Fo based on local strategy
8: end if
Algorithm 2 Process-Content-Object
1: Input: Content Object C[N,SN ], CS, FIB
2: Cache C[N,SN ] with N as the key
3: Fo = FIB.Lookup(SN)
4: Forward C[N,SN ] to Fo based on local strategy
IV. ARCHITECTURE ASSESSMENT
Despite significant research progress over the past 5 years,
the PIT no longer seems to be a practical solution for content
object forwarding in CCN. As discussed earlier, router PITs
are prone to DoS (specifically, IF) attacks. They also store
information already available from FIBs (consumer routable
prefixes) and enforce unnatural path symmetry in an increas-
ingly asymmetric Internet. Moreover, flow and congestion
control algorithms are being pushed towards receivers instead
of in the network based on state maintained in PITs. Our
simple stateless CCN variant mitigates these problems by
specifying the use of source and destination prefixes. To
support our claims, we compare the stateful and stateless CCN
architectures with respect to aforementioned features. We then
discuss both advantages and disadvantages of stateless CCN.
A. Revisiting PIT Benefits
Reverse-Path Routing. Our stateless CCN scheme requires
FIBs to be updated to accommodate RBN prefixes advertised
by consumers. It might seem that this would lead to a tremen-
dous increase in FIB size. However, recall that CCN interest
(and now, content) forwarding is based on LPM. In stateless
CCN, consumers announce their RBNs only to their first-hop
routers (e.g., an access point), which, in turn, combines all
its consumers’ RBNs and announces an aggregate prefix to
neighboring routers, similar to the Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) route-aggregation feature [40].
Also, path asymmetry between interest and content mes-
sages in stateless CCN is more compliant with networking and
routing practices of today’s Internet. As argued in Section II-A,
ISPs are likely to adopt an architecture that agrees with their
present business model.
Forwarding Overhead. Stateful CCN dictates that, when
processing an interest, a router should, in the worst case:
(1) attempt to satisfy the interest from its cache, (2) create
or modify a PIT entry for the interest, and (3) perform a
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FIB lookup. Meanwhile, stateless CCN eliminates (2), which
reduces router operations to cache and FIB lookups.
Removing the PIT also simplifies and improves content
forwarding logic. Instead of indexing the PIT to obtain down-
stream interfaces, a router performs a FIB lookup for each
content, just as it does in processing an interest. We claim
that a simple FIB lookup is more efficient than using the PIT
for forwarding content. After a PIT lookup, a PIT entry is
flushed once a content object is forwarded. This ”flush” incurs
an additional write operation in the routers’ fast path. Stateless
CCN replaces this with a simple LPM-based FIB lookup.
Note that LPM algorithms have been intensively studied,
constructed, and fine-tuned to cope with multi-gigabit, and
even terabit, IP packet processing [41]–[43].
Flow and Congestion Control. The current receiver driven
flow and congestion control algorithms are unaffected in our
stateless variant. The only difference is that now routers
are unable to compute the RTT for a given interest-content
exchange. Given that recent algorithms do not rely on these
calculations in the network anyway, this is a tolerable loss.
B. Content Caching
As mentioned earlier, using RBNs for content routing
does not preserve path symmetry. In fact, it encourages path
asymmetry. Consequently, content might be cached along a
different path than the interest originally traversed. It might
seem that adjacent (or nearby) consumers for the same content
would therefore not benefit from in-network caching. We argue
that this is not so.
Firstly, CCN content includes a producer-specified cache
hint that suggests how long routers ought to cache this content.
Routers are expected to honor this hint when managing the data
in their caches. Secondly, recall that routers can unilaterally
decide whether to enable caching for none, some, or all
content. Thirdly, cache eviction strategies might reduce cache
entry lifetime to much less than the suggested value. For
instance, core routers would most likely not cache content
given their high processing rates. Meanwhile, consumer-facing
routers would handle much less traffic and are thus more
likely to cache content for the required amount of time. In
fact, caching has been shown to be most cost effective at the
edges [24], e.g., at the tier-3 ISP level. Since nearby consumers
share the same edge router, they will all benefit from caching
popular content in that router. This observation is supported
by the results obtained in [16], wherein it is shown that path
symmetry is highest at the edges of the network.
Figure 3 shows an example of caching in stateless CCN.
The topology has 4 autonomous systems (AS-s). AS1 and AS4
are stubs representing tier-3 ISPs, while AS2 and AS3 are
transits representing tier-1 ISPs.8 Interests issued by Cr are
forwarded towards P along the dotted (red) path, and content is
forwarded back to Cr along the dashed (blue) path. Assuming
that caching only occurs near the edges, content sent from P
to Cr gets cached in AS4. Consequently, interests for the same
content issued by other consumers in AS4 would be satisfied
from cache(s) of AS4.
8We ignore tier-2 ISPs for simplicity.
Fig. 3. Caching in stateless CCN. AS1 and AS4 are stub autonomous
system representing tier-3 ISPs, AS2 and AS3 are transit autonomous system
representing tier-1 ISPs.
C. Infrastructure Security
We now discuss both beneficial and problematic infrastruc-
ture security issues in stateless CCN, such as (D)DoS attacks.
Interest Flooding. Stateless CCN mitigates this attack by
eliminating its root cause – the PIT. Without per-request state
in routers, this attack vector is removed. This represents the
major advantage of stateless CCN.
Reflection Attacks. Interest and content path symmetry in
CCN prevents reflection attacks. However, in stateless CCN,
RBNs serve as a de facto source address in interest, and
destination in content, messages. Thus, reflection attacks re-
appear. Fortunately, the ingress filtering technique described
in [30] can be used to mitigate them.
Cache and Content Poisoning. Content authentication in
stateless CCN is identical to that in the stateful CCN architec-
ture. It is done by producers signing content objects or using
Self-Cerftifying Names (SCN) [44]. Regardless of the method,
all content must be verified by consumers. However, verifica-
tion is not mandatory for routers, for several reasons; see [44]
for more details. Lack of in-network content verification opens
the door for content poisoning attacks [45]. Moreover, due to
possible path asymmetry in RBN-based content forwarding,
content poisoning countermeasures that work in the current
CCN architecture do not apply anymore.
The PIT enables a router to apply the so-called Interest-Key
Binding (IKB) rule [44], whereby consumers and producers
collaborate to provide routers with enough (minimal) trust
information to perform content verification. This information
is currently stored in the PIT. However, as mentioned above,
path asymmetry renders IKB impractical. In stateless CCN, a
router might receive (unsolicited) content without prior interest
traversing the same path. If such content is returned on a path
different from the original interest, routers cannot trust any
information it carries.
Consumer Privacy. Lack of source addresses in stateful CCN
facilitates a degree of consumer privacy. RBNs in stateless
CCN negate this benefit. However, given highly descriptive na-
ture of content names, end-to-end encryption might be needed
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Fig. 4. The DFN and AT&T topologies.
to achieve better privacy, even in stateful CCN. Moreover,
since many current applications customize content per con-
sumer, both interest and content messages, if left unencrypted,
might include enough information to identify the consumer.
Thus, for sensitive or consumer-specific content, stateless CCN
does not necessarily yield worse privacy due to the use of
encryption.
Beyond naming issues, in-network caching can be abused
by an adversary to compromise both consumer and producer
privacy [46]. By measuring the time required for content
retrieval, an adversary can learn whether specific content was
recently requested by other nearby consumers. This attack
is still applicable in stateless CCN since in-network caching
remains a feature. Fortunately, countermeasures proposed in
[46], [47] are equally effective in both architectures.
D. Deployment Issues
The main purpose of designing a stateless CCN architecture
is to provide an alternative to the current stateful CCN. This
does not mean that one must replace the other. In fact, they
can co-exist and allow the consumers to select one or the other
on-demand. Consider the following scenarios:
1) Stateless CCN: Cr includes an RBN (SN ) in an interest
and upstream routers forward it as necessary. Stateful
routers create PIT entries and stateless routers do not.
In both cases, the interest is forwarded according to the
FIB using content name N . Upon receipt of a content
message, a stateful router uses its PIT to forward the
content downstream, while a stateless router does that
using the FIB and SN . In this case, stateful forwarders
simply ignore the SN fields in both interests and content
objects. This makes the proposed stateless CCN back-
wards compatible with the current CCN architecture.
2) Stateful CCN: Cr issues an interest per current CCN
rules. If a stateless router receives such an interest, it
generates a NACK indicating that the interest cannot be
forwarded further. To handle this NACK, some down-
stream node must provide a RBN for the interest and
re-forward it as needed. This node can be an AS gateway
(i.e., a router that can forward packets to and from other
ASs) or, worst case, the consumer.
Any node that satisfies an interest must honor its version
(stateless or stateful) when producing a response. For example,
if a producer (or a caching router) receives an interest with an
RBN, it must reply according to stateless CCN by keeping
both N and SN in the corresponding content.
We claim that this type of hybrid approach aligns very
well with CCN’s edge-caching strategy [24] and current path
asymmetry in the Internet’s core. Recall that stateless CCN
makes it impossible for stateless routers to verify content they
forward. Moreover, if a router cannot verify a content then
it should not cache it. Thus, caching would only occur near
the edges where PITs are located. We envision a network
where all routers within an AS have PITs that are used for
egress interests, i.e., those generated by consumers within the
AS. Traditional verification techniques can be applied at these
routers for returned content. If an interest leaves an AS, the
gateway first supplies a RBN before forwarding it upstream.
This interest will not induce any PIT state upstream and
therefore will not result in the corresponding content object
being cached outside of the AS. This is not problematic though
since the results of [24] imply that caching near the edge
(i.e., within the AS above) is most effective. Moreover, this
approach allows path asymmetry outside of the AS, which
aligns with the real-world routing strategies noted in [16].
Another side-effect of the hybrid approach is that it can
be used as an IF attack recovery mechanism. If R implements
a PIT but does not have enough resources to create a new
entry for Int, R can respond with a NACK similar to what is
described above. In this case, if R is under an IF attacks and its
PIT resources is exhausted, neither current nor future interests
will be dropped. The disadvantage of this approach as an
effective IF attack countermeasure is that (1) it is reactive, so
it can only be used after the attack occurs, and (2) it incurs an
additional end-to-end latency since consumers (or downstream
routers) need to reissue the interests following stateless CCN
guidelines.
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(a) Interest processing overhead in the DFN topology with 160 consumers. (b) Data processing overhead in the DFN topology with 160 consumers.
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(c) Interest processing overhead in the AT&T topology with 160 consumers.
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(d) Data processing overhead in the AT&T topology with 160 consumers.
Fig. 5. Forwarding overhead in stateful (red) and stateless (blue) CCN variants.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
We now evaluate performance of the stateless CCN in
relation to stateful CCN. Our key metric is the degree to
which forwarding overhead is lowered by stateless routing. To
do this, we modified the ndnSIM [48] simulator, a simplified
NDN implementation as a NS-3 [49] module, to support the
stateless CCN architecture proposed in Section III. Specifi-
cally, we modified the NDN Forwarding Daemon (NFD) [50]
to supporting interest forwarding based on content names and
content forwarding based on RBNs, without leaving PIT states
behind.
We then simulated topologies based on the Deutsches
ForschungsNetz (DFN), the German Research Network [51],
[52], and AT&T networks (shown in Figures 4(a) and 4(b),
respectively). Each topology consists of 160 consumers9, a
single producer connected to one of the edge routers, and
9Each consumer node in the figures consists of 10 actual consumers.
multiple routers (more than 30). Each consumer generates 10
interests per second, with a random suffix so as to avoid cache
hits. This is done to force interest to traverse all the path to the
producer, hence maximize the amount of processing that takes
place in the forwarders in both the upstream and downstream
paths. This captures the worst-case scenario.
Our results are shown in Figure 5. In both topologies,
we observe approximately 63% improvement in per packet
forwarding performance of interest messages. We also observe
a 66% improvement in processing content objects. These cost
savings are quite significant, especially, for core routers that
might process packets at rates of 100Gbps and over.
Furthermore, the overall content retrieval latency is signifi-
cantly improved when using stateless forwarders as compared
to stateful ones. Figure 6 shows a comparison of the RTT
performance for both forwarders in the DFN topology. In
this experiment, consumers always request unique content in
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Fig. 6. Content retrieval latency as a function of number of hops between
consumers and producers for both stateful and stateless forwarders. Note that
paths with 3 hops do not exist in this topology.
order to avoid cache hits.10. Figure 6 illustrates the average
RTT to fetch content objects as a function of the number
of hops between consumers and the producer. We notice a
content retrieval latency improvement of more than 50%. This
improvement reaches 77% for paths consisting of 6 hops.
To summarize, our results show that stateless forwarding
leads to better routing and content retrieval performance.
VI. RELATED WORK
PIT-focused DoS attacks in CCN are a well-known problem
[31]. Rate-based [32]–[34] and statistical-based tests [35]–[37]
have been proposed to detect these attacks and subsequently
limit the incoming interfaces upon which malicious interests
arrive. However, this only treats a symptom of the problem–
it does not solve the core issue of PIT state in routers. Dai
et al. [53] propose a technique called “interest tracebacks” to
identify malicious attackers and limit the rate at which they
can send messages to the network. The key observation is
that PIT state leaves a trace that terminates at the source of
an interest. The network can use this trail to then identify
the attacker. However, this approach depends on localized
attackers sending interests at a high rate; it does not work
for highly distributed adversaries. Similar in-network throttling
techniques were discussed in [32] and [34]. Complementary
to this general technique, Al-Sheikh et al. [54] introduce FIB
exclude filters that seek to prevent malicious interests from
propagating upstream to locations in the network where the
target content cannot possibly be served. These filters work for
static content, only, and cannot be used to prevent interests for
dynamic content from being forwarded. Li et al. [55] propose
the use of consumer-based puzzles that must be solved as
a native rate-limiting technique. These puzzles, or “interest
cash,” are generated by producers to be solved and must
10We do not take caching into consideration to eliminate any randomize
effect it might have on content retrieval latency. Such randomized effects can
be cause by different cache eviction policies.
be completed for each interest. Although this approach is
effective, it severely harms benign consumers.
Techniques to outright replace the PIT have also been
proposed. [13] devised a “semi-stateful” solution wherein
packets are marked (with Bloom Filters [56]) to be forwarded
correctly. This approach shifts the state that was once in
the PIT to the packets themselves and creates unnecessary
communication and control overhead in the network. In a
similar vein, Wang et al. [57] describe a protocol variant
wherein resource-constrained PITs can offload the per-request
state into interests that are forwarded. This technique puts PIT
state “on the wire” and allows a PIT to naturally decrease
in size as content is returned without dropping interests from
benign consumers and routers. This is in contrast to our work
where we put defer state information to the routing protocol.
Salah et al. [58] used a router coordination framework
called CoMon (Coordination with Lightweight Monitoring) to
enable adjacent nodes to share information about forwarding
state and traffic. Select routers are assigned the role of “mon-
itor.” Their goal is to monitor interest and content exchanges
and measure the (un)satisfaction rate. This information is
periodically reported to a central “domain controller” that
is in charge of processing the traffic reports to detect and
respond to IF attacks. Monitoring routers are chosen based on
their location in the network and closeness to producers. This
solution assumes an unrealistic static topology and centralized
post facto detection mechanism. In summary, this scheme is
an extension to previous rate-based throttling solutions.
Almirshari et al. [59] proposed a technique to “piggyback”
interest and content objects to enable high throughput bidirec-
tional communication in NDN. Their approach introduces a
new packet type in addition to interests and content objects. It
also requires that interests are unnaturally extended to carry
application data in the name. Moreover, their approach is
still susceptible to IF attacks since it requires PIT state for
bidirectional communication. Dai et al. [60] study extensions
to the PIT to support modern applications such as streaming
services and online gaming. They propose to create long-lived
PIT entries to enable bidirectional communication between
clients and servers. This only serves to make adversary’s job
easier in an IF attack.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Motivated by the Interest Flooding attacks in current CCN,
we proposed an alternative CCN architecture without PITs,
called stateless CCN. We investigated the benefits of PIT and
realized that they do not significantly improve the performance
of content distribution. Our proposed architecture is based on
Routable Backward Names (RBNs) used to route content back
towards requesting consumers. We provided a comprehensive
performance and security assessment of the proposed stateless
CCN architecture. We also discussed how it is practical to
deploy this architecture in today’s IP networks and showed
that deploying it alongside with current CCN does not achieve
the expected benefits and performance.
However, removing the PIT came at the expense of losing
support of CCN features and extensions developed throughout
the last few years. Consumer anonymity, for instance, cannot
be achieved in RBN-based stateless CCN at the network layer
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without using supporting protocols such as ANDa¯NA [61].
Moreover, the Interest-Key Binding rule (IKB) [44] that allows
efficient content trust at the network layer relies heavily on
PIT. Thus, the IKB rule cannot be applied in RBN-based
stateless CCN. We believe that the advantages of the proposed
CCN architecture outweigh its drawbacks. We therefore defer
solutions to the aforementioned disadvantages, e.g., anonymity
and trust, to future work.
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